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NOTES AND COMMENTS
The Constitutional Right to Free Communication of the
Institutionalized Resident
Justified by the generic first amendment protection to unabridged ex-
pression and association, a United States citizen cannot be unreasonably
denied the right to communicate by mail ;1 by telephone ;2 with legal coun-
sel;3 with the opposite sex;4 with others.5 In most states where such a
citizen becomes "mentally ill," the person may be involuntarily civilly
committed.6 Although there is no justification for such a commitment
1 See, Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 306 (1965) (An act which
directs administrative officials to inspect and appraise mail is a violation of the first
amendment of the United States Constitution) ; Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51
(1964) ; (Prompt judicial review of mail censorship is constitutionally essential);
Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U.S. 146 (1964) (".... grave constitutional questions are
immediately raised once it is said that the use of mail censorship is essential) ; Mil-
waukee Social Democratic Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 37 (1921, Holmes
Dissent) ("The United States may give up the Post Office when it sees fit, but
while it carries it on the use of the mails is almost as much a part of free speech a's
the right to use our tongues . . . .") ; Davis v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. App. 2d 8, 20
(1959) (dictum) (an absolute ban on access to the mails would be unconstitutional) ;
W. HACBTEN. THE SUPREME COURT ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 180-91 (1968)
("The use of the mails is now closer to being a basic right belonging to the people
rather than a privilege bestowed by government and subject to revocation.")
2 Cf., Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939) ; Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. F.C.C., 381 F.2d, 908 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Massengale v. United States, 240 F.2d
781 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 909 (1957).
' See e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 70 (1970) (At administrative pro-
ceeding to terminate welfare benefits the recipient must be permitted to retain an
attorney), Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) ; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 68-69 (1932) (dictum) ("If in any case, civil or criminal, a . . . court were
arbitrarily to refuse to hear a party by counsel, it reasonably may not be doubted
that such a refusal would be a denial of a hearing, and therefore, of due process in
the constitutional sense.") ; Comment, Representation By Counsel in Administrative
Proceedings, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 394, 96 (1958) (The right to counsel is found in
the United States Constitution amendment VI. All states except Virginia guarantee
counsel to the criminal defendant. Nine state constitutions provide for retained
counsel in civil actions).
'See, Eistentadt v. Boird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S.
479 (1965).
'See e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) ("the Constitution pro-
tects the right to receive information and ideas . . . regardless of their social
worth.") ; NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (dictum) (freedom of speech
and of association are inextricably tied. A person has the right to "advocacy of
both public and private points of view" and "associate freely with others.").
6 "Of the forty-three jurisdictions which now provide some form of judicial hos-
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beyond the fact that the individual is sick and is in need of care,7 often the
individual's first amendment freedoms are restricted while a resident of
a mental institution.' This article will focus on the extent to which such
restrictions violate the constitutional right of free expression and associa-
tion, e.g. by mail, by telephone, with legal counsel, with the opposite sex,
by general visitation.
The first and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitu-
tion restrict the government's ability to control free communication to the
extent that the abridgment serves no reasonable government interest.9
Therefore, an analysis of the status of a resident's constitutional rights
should begin by surveying the premise that, a resident retains all rights
of an ordinary citizen except those expressly, or by necessary implication,
taken from him ° pursuant to a legitimate state interest. It has already
been noted that the state interest in committing the "mentally ill" is care.'
pitalization, only nine phrase the sole criterion for hospitalization in terms of
whether the individual is dangerous to himself or others." "Treatment," "welfare,"
and "best interests" are the predominant criteria for commitment in the forty-three
states. S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 36, 72-76
(rev. ed. 1971).
Id. at 36.
"Patients in state mental hospitals are deprived of rights not by law, but be-
cause they are unaware of their rights or are unable to assert them." Rollins, Sug-
gcstcd Revisions of North Carolina's Laws on Involuntary Hospitalilation for
Mental Illness, NORTH CAROLINA MEDICAL JOURNAL 1019, 20 (Dec. 1972) ; "With-
out actual observation of hospital practices, it is impossible to discern what rights
patients have in those states which do not have statutory provisions in these rights
to free expression areas. Unfortunately, comparable uncertainties exist regarding
the actual protection of patients' rights in many of the states which do guarantee
these rights by statute." BRAKEL & ROCK, supra note 6, at 155; As part of a federal
grant (ESEA Title I-P.L. 89-313 eight law students, including the author made
a survey on the implementation of the North Carolina Department of Mental
Health on Patients' Rights in four North Carolina institutions. The results some-
what substantiate the fears suggested by Brakel and Rock. Buford & Gostin, Rights
of Mental Patients in North Carolina's Mental Health Institutions (1973).
' O'Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367, 77 (1968) ("We think it clear that
a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional
power of the Government; if it furthers an important governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedom is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest .... ;") ; See also, C. BLACK JR., PER-
SPECTIVES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 89-93 (1969). Comment, Less Drastic Means
and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969).
"People v. McCloud, 310 N.Y.S.2d 772 (1970) (mentally incompetent are not,
by their misfortune, stripped of constitutional rights). See, Coffin v. Reichard, 143
F.2d 443, 45 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 887 (1945) ("A prisoner retains
all the rights of an ordinary citizen except those expressly, or by necessary im-
plication, taken from him by law.").
" See note 7 supra. See also, P. MARSCHALL, THE MENTALLY ILL AND THE
RIGHT TO TREATMENT 40 (Morris ed. 1970).
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The legal theory of such a commitment is the pare ns patriae power of the
state.'2 Parens patriae is a right of sovereignty and imposes a duty oil
the sovereign to care for persons who, because afflicted with some dis-
ability, are unable to act in their own best interests.'" The constitutional
inquiry, therefore, is whether restriction of free expression is related to
the care or "best interests" of the individual or any other rational state
interest.
A. Therapeutic Justification for Encouraging Free Exercise of
Constitutional Right to Communicate
In the interests of "care" the concept of "normalization,"'" would dic-
tate that a resident should not be restricted in the opportunity for free
expression and association. To expeditiously return the liberty the state
has taken from the resident, the institution must keep intact all of the
normal behaviors which are vital to a functioning citizen. This is neces-
sary to prevent the resident from becoming "institutionalized," i.e., overly
dependent on the hospital "way of life."' 5 The resident should not grow
unaccustomed to exercising communicative skills because this is a normal
behavior which will help the individual in readjustment to the com-
munity. Normal communication with others is a recognized therapeutic
12 BRAKEL & ROCK, supra note 6, at 36.
'Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202.010 (1954); Mo. REV. STAT. § 202.780(5) (1953):
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTir, FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, A DRAFT
ACT GOVERNING HOSPITALIZATION OF TILE MENTALLY ILL, Public Health Service
No. 51 § 1 (1952); N.M. STAT. ANN. §34-2-1(a) (1953); N.D. REv. CODE
§ 25-01-01(1) (1957 Supp.) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-7-28(9) (1951): W,\Sir. REV.
CODE § 71.02.010 (1959); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-1-2 (1955).
" Defined as a set of principles derived from the belief that mental health in-
stitutions should primarily serve as agents for a resident's rehabilitation to society.
i.e., each institution should allow the individual to live as normally as possible. The
principle of normalization has been given constitutional sanction in Wyatt v.
Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), 344 F. Supp. 373 (order and decree.
appendix) and statutory sanction in CAr.. ANN. CODE WELFARE AND 1NSTIT-
TIONS §§ 5001, 5115, 5200 (1969).
" Even though the hospital may have "normalized" the resident's preconimit-
ment deviant behavior, the individual cannot leave the hospital because lie or she
has grown accustomed and dependent upon institutional life. See Goffman, Char-
acteristics of Total Institutions, PREVENTIVE AND SOCIAL PSYCHIATRY 43, 45
("mass movement" and other "totalistic" features of institutions foster dependence,
impair ability to make small independent decisions). See also BARNES & TEETERS,
NEW HORIZONS IN CRIMINOLOGY 499-503, (3d ed. 1959). (Becoming unaccustomed
to exercising communicative skills in prison is a non-normalized behavior which
can have adverse consequences when the prisoner is released) ; American Handbook
of Psychiatry 1832 (ed. S. Arieti 1959) (the hospital should not make life too
simple for the resident because this will impede a proper adjustment to community
living).
80 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
need of the institutionalized resident.1 6 Further, communication "keeps
the resident in contact with the outside world, helps to hold in check
some of the morbidity and hopelessness produced by ... (institutional)
life . . . , stimulates his more natural and human impulses and otherwise
may make contributions to better mental health."'" At the same time, the
individual is exposed to countervailing ideas1" and is better able to be
informed on such things as government issues (to cast an intelligent
vote' 9 ) and patients' rights (for self-assertion of rights2") which are help-
ful in the resident's habilitation.2 '
B. Therapeutic Justification for the Restriction of Constitutional
Right to Communicate 2 2
Some will argue that restrictions on communication are necessary for
the well-being of the resident 23 and therefore are justified under the state's
parens patriae power. 4 Such restrictions may not be violative of the
United States Constitution's first and fourteenth amendments because they
are made pursuant to the rational state interest of providing care 5 for the
mentally disabled. The hospital might rationally justify restrictions on
first amendment freedoms through its medical prerogatives, i.e., the so-
' LANGNER & MICHAEL, LIFE STRESS AND MENTAL HEALTH 128 (1963)
("... social isolation is a symptom of mental disturbance as well as a causal
factor") ; Arieti, supra note 15. "Every psychiatrist is familiar with the fact that
when he opens one of his textbooks and runs across the description of a pathological
phenomenon-be it hallucination and delusion or resistance and aggression the
pathology is described in terms of a patient's communicative behavior," at 855:
Symposium on Preventive and Social Psychiatry Apr. 15-17, Walter Reed Arm'y
Institute of Research, Wash. D.C. (1958); See, AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL Asso-
CIATION, MANUAL OF CORRECTION STANDARDS 400 (1959); Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
87th Cong. 1st Sess., Pt. 1 at 45 (1961) ; Arieti supra, note 14, at 909, 17, 24.
BARNES & TEETER, supra note 15, at 492.
See generally, Comment, The Right of Expression in Prison, 40 S. CAL. L.
REV. 19 (1967).
'9N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-55 (1963) (hospitalization (toes not automatically
livest the right to vote or other civil rights).
"0 Rollins, supra note 8 at 1020 ("Patients in state mental hospitals are deprived
of rights not by law, but because they are unaware of their rights.
" See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
22 The responses that follow are taken partly from Buford & Gostin, supra
note 8.
" BRAKEL & ROCK, supra note 6 at 155. (Although modern niedico-legal
opinion rejects the notion that residents are incapable of exercising their rights,
"this is not to say that in modern times mental patients should retain all their
personal rights. Effective treatment in many instances necessitates a withdrawal of
certain patient rights.")
"' See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
"2 See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
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called medical model, 20 which provides for the medical needs of residents,
or because of administrative needs of the hospital. 27 The most prevalent
use of the medical model to restrict rights to communicate is "milieu"
therapy. Here, the hospital manipulates the resident's environment to
modify deviant behavior or personality traits. 28  This therapeutic notion
can be used to isolate the resident from a "toxic" environment by restrict-
ing communication between the resident and his environment. 9 Similarly,
the resident's judgment might be so impaired that restrictions on com-
munication might be necessary. The paradigm example would be the
manic depressive reactive in a hypomanic stage (increased assertiveness,
careless gaiety and boundless energy). The person to some extent betrays
his or her normal tendencies and is now irrepressible and often uncon-
ventional in speech and manner. The person is narcissistic, childishly
proud, glib of tongue, genial of hand, extravagant with money, pawns be-
longings, full of pranks, imprudent (e.g., spouting obscenity), openly
hostile and aggressive.3 0
1. Mail and Telephone
During a hypomanic phase the individual "writes numerous letters."
"No sooner, perhaps has he posted a letter than he decides that the mail
is too slow for his urgent business so he dispatches a telegram to his
correspondent."'" Should the hospital, acting in the resident's best in-
terests, censor his mail or telephone communications in order to prevent
the resident from: (a) impairing his integrity and credibility in the com-
munity to where he may be released in the future? (b) writing away for
a subscription to a magazine he cannot pay for? (c) writing threatening
2°Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. at 413 (1970) ("The
medical model essentially is that behavioral variances are analogous to disease in
the physical body. The implication of the analogy is that there is a distinct dis-
continuity in the continuum of behavioral differences which can be objectively
discerned, measured and labeled 'pathological.'"
21 See, Henry v. Ciccone, 315 F. Supp. 889 (W.D. Mo. 1970) (Inspection of
mail of unconvicted resident of a medical center was justified in order to maintain
administrative order). See also, S. CA. L. REV., supra note 18 at 411 et seq. (anal-
ysis of the administrative needs of a penal institution).
2 Note, Conditions and other Technologies Used to 'Treat?' 'Rehabilitate?' 'De-
molish?' Prisoners and Mental Patients, 45 S. CA. L. REV. 616, 21-22 (1972).
" Cf., Arieti, supra note 14, at 1829 ("If, in spite of the best available out-
patient care, the patient's suffering continues to increase, removal from his environ-
ment may be a necessary step to bring symptomatic relief.")
"oL. KoLo, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 369-70 (1973).
31 Id. at 370.
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letters to a family member or government official? (d) receiving contra-
band in the mail?
2. Interaction With the Opposite Sex and Other Associations
"The hypomanic is often erotic and, if a man, may indulge in sexual
excess, while a previously chaste and modest young woman may become
sexually promiscuous," often making indecent and obscene proposals. 2
The manic depressive in a hypomanic stage also is overreactive to the
extent of violent motor excitement. In the hospital, the resident may tear
his or her clothing and destroy objects. 3 Acting in the best interests
of the individual, of other residents and of outside visitors, should the
hospital allow the resident to: (a) interact with the opposite sex? (,b) in-
teract with other residents generally? (c) interact with visitors? (d) make
visits outside the hospital (e) interact with legal counsel ?
If given the additional psychiatric fact that, on recovery from a manic
state the individual perceives his or her past behavior as unpleasant and
is sorry for such behavior,3" should the law uphold hospital restrictions on
free expression and association in those instances ?15
C. Lowest Common Denominator: A Prior Restraint?
A hospital administrator may point to a specific resident, e.g., a hypo-
manic, in a specific instance and give a rational reason for restricting first
amendment rights in that particular case. In the constitutional language
of free expression, the administrator has isolated a particular danger (to
the well-being of the resident or the institution) which is clear and im-
minent.36 The administrator then formulates a general policy of first
82 Id. at 370.
'3 Id. at 371.
14 Id. at 372.
"(See generally, id. at 376-7 (case stud)' : m.m. was in and out of a state mental
hospital for years. During manic phases she signed leases on strange apartments:
bought furniture; went into debt; pawned her rings; wrote checks without finances:
purchased fifty-seven hats; instituted divorce proceedings: smoked excessively and
swore loudly (contrary to usual habits) ; made advances to the physician. In the
last year m.m. has lost her manic symptomatology and has been making an ex-
cellent home and community adjustment as a good housewife and mother. If pos-
sible should the hospital have suppressed her actions while she was in a manic
phase?)
" Whitney v. Cal., 274 U.S. 357, 73 (Brandeis concurring) (1927). The con-
stitutional phrase "clear and present danger" has been frequently used since its
formation in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). As Justice Frank-
furter has pointed out, "clear and present danger" is easy to oversimplify. One
must take account of such things as the relative seriousness of the danger (the
danger of mental illness to a single individual is not as great as that of a potential
overthrow of the government as in Dennis) ; the value of the speech (see, notes
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amendment restriction in that area. One might call this the lowest common
denominator theory of mental hospital administration.3 7 That is, the hos-
pital will restrict freedoms to the extent necessary for the well-being of its
lowest functioning resident in a given area. These restrictions will form a
general hospital policy and will apply to all residents even if they are
capable of exercising, and can benefit from, greater freedoms. For example,
if one resident was harmed by delusional information sent in a letter by the
resident's paranoiac mother, the hospital not only reads and censors all
future letters sent by his mother; not only reads and censors all future
letters sent to him, but reads the censors every letter sent to every resident
as a general hospital policy.
In the constitutional language of free expression, the administrator has
placed a prior restraint on first amendment rights which is presumptively
impermissible."8 Where the government places a restriction on com-
munication before it has been exercised, it must do so with narrow ob-
jectives and definite standards, 9 restricting its scope only to those in-
dividuals which the policy must necessarily reach in order to serve its
purposes.4" In deciding cases where first amendment restrictions were at
18 and 19 supra and accompanying text); and the availability of more moderate
controls (see note 45 infra and accompanying text). Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494, 542 (Frankfurter concurring) (1951). Justice Stone suggested that state
action involving free speech and association has a higher standard of review, as
does state action which impinges on a group with little access to the political
p, ucus~ts (e.g. mentai patients). United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 307 U.S.
144, 52 n. 4 (1938).
" Defined as a minimum trait or characteristic shared by all members of a
group. Placed in the context of mental hospital administration, rules are geared to
the lowest level of communicative skill which is conmmon to all residents. There-
fore, if one person is hypomanic and as a result cannot have free expression and
association, the hospital allows no one to exercise their rights of expression and
association. .Sec, Muller. Involuntary Hospitalization. 9 Comprehcnsive Psychiatry
192 (1968) (Indignant protests arise when a. former mental patient commits a
crime. The result is a restrictive custody policy even though it is not strictly neces-
sary for the welfare of the public.).
' United States v. Washington Post Co., 403 U.S. 713 (1971) Rowan v.
Keefe. 402 U.S. 415 (1971) : Near v. Minn.. 283 U.S. 697 (1931): Alberti v.
Cruise, 383 F.2d 268 (4th Cir. 1967) (In an action for malicious prosecution and
defamation of character, the lower court enjoined the plaintiff from speaking or
writing to the defendant or members of his family. "We think this ...order is a
prior restraint upon Mrs. Alberti's rights of freedom of speech guaranteed by the
First Amendment.").
" Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965).
"0 See generally, Wormuth & Mirkin, The Doctrine of Reasonable Alternative
9 UTAIT L. REV. 254, 67-93 (1964) ; comment, Less Drastic Means and the First
Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969). See also, Chambers. Alternatives to Civil
Comnuitinent of the Mentally Ill: Practical Guides and Constitutional Imperatives,
70 Mich. L. REV. 1108 (1972).
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issue, the Supreme Court has voided state restrictions because "less drastic
means" 41 were available or because of the lack of "precision of regula-
tion"4 2 or because the government policy was not "reasonably drawn so
that the precise evil (was) exposed. '43 A hospital policy promulgated
through the lowest common denominator processes suggested above places
a prior restraint on the exercise of free speech and association of every
resident in the mental hospital. Such a policy may be constitutionally
necessary to combat the "evil" of mental illness for some residents but the
restrictions also apply to others for whom the restrictions serve no habil-
itative purpose (often the restrictions are therapeutically harmful).
Moreover, the lowest common denominator policy of hospital administra-
tion has a more reasonable alternative. Simple entry into the hospital
should not affect first amendment rights. Any restriction necessary be-
cause of a clear and imminent danger to the health of the resident should
be justified, in writing on the individual's hospital record, on an individual
basis by the chief medical officer of the hospital unit.
4 1
A rule based on the lowest common denominator is constitutionally
impermissible. It results in a state policy which is a prior restraint on
first amendment rights; which is overbroad in its application; and for
which there is a more reasonable alternative. That less restrictive al-
ternative reasonably limits its application to individuals who will clearly
and imminently be harmed (or will do harm to others) by the exercise
of certain communicative freedoms.
D. The Few Cases on Point
Courts have been very stingy in exercising their constitutional pre-
rogatives to assure institutionalized residents the right to communicate.
For example, the New York Court of Appeals, in Phagen v. Miller,46 had
4 E.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 268 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479, 88 (1960).
E.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 38 (1963).
" E.g., Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 24 (1968).
'See note 16 supra.
This alternative is in some ways similar to the Draft Act. "Right to com-
munications and visitation; ..." "(a) Subject to the general rules and regulations
of the hospital and except to the extent that the head of the hospital determines that
it is necessary for the medical welfare of the patient to impose these restrictions,
every patient shall be entitled (1) to communicate by sealed mail or otherwise
with persons, including official agencies, inside or outside the hospital; (2) to
receive visitors. . . . A Draft Act Governing Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill
§21, PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLICATION No. 51 (rev. 1952).
'd 317 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1970).
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the opportunity to review a New York statute which limited a patient upon
admission to communicating only once with any person within the state.
The court saw no violation of the first amendment. In fact, when courts
have exercised their constitutional powers to overturn restrictions on
free communication, they have used the United States art. I, § 9 (or
state constitutional) right to habeas corpus,4 7 and not the first amend-
ment right of expression and association.4" This constitutional treatment
of residents' rights is unnecessarily limiting in scope. It protects the
resident's right to communicate with his or her attorney (or other officers
of the court) but does not protect against restrictions on communication
to friends or others.49 Attorneys in the past have even refrained from ask-
ing the court to limit general hospital censoring policies on constitutional
grounds, so long as their right to communicate was not abridged."
The mental health system has escaped strict accountability by First
Amendment standards. Those persons who are stigmatized by the label
"mentally ill" have been exempted from rigorous constitutional protection
of their right to freely communicate and associate. Where courts have
spoken they have done so broadly 5' and without impact. The extent to
which the First Amendment applies to the institutionalized resident needs
definition. The judiciary has not yet extended the "less drastic means"
test to free speech and association in mental institutions. Further, the
courts have never decided whether a uniform policy on free expression and
association in mental institutions-the lowest common denominator
policy-possesses a prior restraint or restricts rights beyond the extent
necessary for rehabilitation or administrative efficiency.
The American attitude that mentally disordered persons should be
removed and isolated from the community "for their own good" is an
outdated and inhumane notion of therapy. This attitude must be dis-
"Hoff v. State, 279 N.Y. 490 (1939) ; People ex rel. Jacobs v. Worthing. 4
N.Y.S.2d 630 (1938) ; In re Weightman's Estate; 126 Pa. Super. 221 (1937).
" But cf., Wyatt v. Stickney supra note 14 at appendix (right to communica-
tion is part of the constitutional right to treatment).
"But see, Hanson v. Biddle, 84 Kan. 877 (1911) (The court interpreted the
Kansas statute to allow communication with friends but forbid communication
with attorneys).
"Hoff v. State, sudpra note 46. (The hospital had a policy of censoring mail
but the attorney failed to challenge its constitutionality.
" Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 24 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ("additional re-
strictions beyond those necessarily entailed by the hospitalization are as much in
need of justification as any other deprivation of liberty.") ; Lake v. Cameron, 364
F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ("deprivations of liberty solely because of dangers to
the [mentally] ill persons themselves should not go beyond what is necessary for
their protection."). See, In re Jones, 338 F. Supp. 428 (D.D.C. 1972).
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carded  and  replaced with  strict  enforcement  of  First   Amendment  rights 
in mental health facilities. 
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